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This paper originates in a nagging doubt. For the past eight years, I have been researching 
non-state manifestations of violence in Nicaragua. Part of the analysis that I have been 
developing in relation to these associates them to the effective disintegration of the 
Nicaraguan state. During recent visits to Nicaragua, however, it has become increasingly 
evident to me that although the Nicaraguan state may have weakened significantly in relation 
to what it was in the past, and in particular to what it was and was imagined to be in the 
revolutionary Sandinista era, this does not mean that it is no longer a significant actor within 
the Nicaraguan social context. Rather, it is increasingly clear to me that the Nicaraguan state 
has undergone a significant transformation, the nature of which this paper constitutes a first 
attempt to grasp from an anthropological perspective. 
 
Although the study of order has long been a central topic of interest to the anthropological 
endeavour, the discipline has traditionally had difficulties clearly conceptualising the 
institutions of socia l structuration. This has particularly been the case with regard to the 
anthropological imagination of the state, perhaps the most critical – certainly the most 
prominent – of social institutions linked to the constitution and maintenance of order in the 
modern era.1 On the one hand, as Michael Taussig points out, anthropology is permeated with 
something of a “peculiar sacred and erotic attraction, even thralldom, combined with disgust” 
for the state, which he labels a “state fetishism”. 2 On the other hand, there simultaneously 
exists little in the way of consensus as to what the state actually is, with scholars having 
treated the phenomenon as “an actual organization”, 3 “an idea as well as a system”,4 an 
“ideological object”, 5 a “myth”, 6 or even “a fiction of the philosophers”.7 Indeed, this 
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multiplicity of interpretations recently prompted one anthropologist to even go so far as to 
declare that the idea of the state had suffered “a death by conceptualisation”. 8 
 
In many ways, though, the reverse is true, as this diversity of interpretations reveals the state 
to be a multifaceted phenomenon, with a wide range of effects and consequences. 
Consequently, in order to comprehend the state, it is perhaps best “to disaggregate [it] into the 
multitude of discrete operations, procedures, and representations in which it appears in 
...everyday life”. 9 Such an enterprise is beyond the scope of this paper, and instead I want to 
focus my attention on unpacking one specific aspect of the modern state, namely the nature of 
its ‘governmentality’. The concept of ‘governmentality’ was coined by Michel Foucault, and 
incorporates both a notion of government and a notion of rationality.10 In other words, it is a 
term that refers to the logic of governance, both in terms of its aims and its methods. In this 
paper, I will limit myself to considering this issue specifically in relation to the constitution 
and maintenance of a form of social order, and will furthermore concentrate on exploring the 
potential relationship between this process and the exercise of violence. 
 
The state’s use of violence is one of the most critical issues concerning the analysis of state 
governmentality. Paraphrasing Candace Vogler and Patchen Markell, violence can in many 
ways be said to be something of a spectre haunting the notion of the state.11 From the 
anonymous Bhagavad Gita to the writings of Max Weber, via those of Plato, St. Augustine, 
Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza, and Karl Marx, among others, the defining image of 
the state has been one that sees it as a compact between human beings accustomed to the 
recourse to violence in the process of self-assertion and self-preservation. Individuals 
surrender their right to fight one another and invest this right to violence in a common 
sovereign power – the most prominent example being the state12 – that commands their 
obedience for the sake of peace, justice, prosperity, and security. This view of state 
governmentality is widespread, and even to a certain extent rather commonsensical, but it also 
presents something of a critical paradox. On the one hand, it can be contended that violence 
constitutes the justification for the state’s existence because of the continuously rumbling 
threat of violence in a world inhabited by potentially dangerous individuals. On the other 
hand, however, it can also be maintained that the rationale for the state derives from violence 
more directly, insofar as the state is conceived as the institutional regulator of society, 
bringing peace and prosperity to the unruly world of human beings through the exercise of 
violence. 
 
From this perspective, as Elias, Tilly and Olson put forward in relation to different contexts, 
the defining quality of the state in effect becomes its use of violence to instrumentally ensure 
order.13 This violence is fundamentally different to the individualised violence inherent in 
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what Thomas Hobbes calls the “state of nature”. 14 It can in many ways be qualified as 
redemptive violence, a source of salvation in a fallen world, enjoying a special legitimacy that 
other forms of violence do not. Certainly, as Max Weber famously pointed out, it is the fact 
that the state has “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” – as opposed to the 
simple monopoly over violence – that sets it apart from other violent social phenomena.15 At 
the same time, however, Benedict de Spinoza draws attention to the fact that the legitimacy of 
state violence arises less from its ends and more from the state’s ability to exercise this 
violence in an effective manner.16 In other words, it develops less from the aims of this 
violence but rather from their actual achievement. This raises a key question that I take as the 
starting point for my inquiry: what happens when the state lacks the capacity to effectively 
achieve its ordering endeavour through the exercise of violence? 
 
I begin this paper by considering the premise that patterns of violence have undergone a 
fundamental shift in contemporary Latin America, from being predominantly state-related 
forms of political violence to non-state forms of social and economic violence, due to the 
weakening of states. With reference to the example of Nicaraguan youth gangsterism, I 
underline the way in which such latter forms of violence can nevertheless constitute modes of 
social ordering, which suggests that it is important not to underestimate the ontological 
correspondence between state and non-state forms of violence in Latin America. At the same 
time, however, this apparent correspondence raises some problematic epistemological issues, 
which lead me into a discussion of the nature of state governmentality, for which I propose an 
alternative conception that I then briefly exemplify in the Nicaraguan context. I conclude with 
some thoughts on how to better understand the state’s continuing role as an actor in the 
contemporary Latin American panorama of violence. 
 
 
Violence, the state, and social sovereignty in contemporary Latin America 
It has become increasingly common to talk about a “crisis of governance” in contemporary 
Latin America.17 This cris is is perceived to involve an institutional erosion of the state due to 
the twin processes of neo- liberalism – which is leading to an ever-increasing reduction of the 
resources available to the state as a socio-economic actor – and globalisation – which is seen 
to have debilitated the state by subordinating its capacity to shape the national arena to 
supranational institutions and processes.18 The resulting ‘weak’ states are in particular seen to 
be increasingly limited in their ability to control the people s and territories they are associated 
with, and over which they have historically established and maintained order.19 This is widely 
seen to have fundamentally changed regional patterns of violence during the course of the 
past decade and a half. In particular, it is held that there has been a shift in the political 
economy of violence, with state-related forms of violence having declined markedly, and 
given way to more diffuse social and economic forms of violence, principally involving non-
state actors. As Teresa Caldeira succinctly summarises, “now the most visible forms of 
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violence stem not from ideological conflicts over the nature of the political system but from 
delinquency and crime”. 20  
 
At the same time, despite this changed political economy of brutality, incidences of violence 
in contemporary Latin America have reached unprecedented levels.21 Although this trend is 
generalised throughout the region, it is perhaps most apparent in contemporary Central 
America, where criminal violence is now so prevalent that levels of violence are comparable 
to, or even higher than, the decade of war which affected the region during the 1980s.22 The 
consensus is that this predicament is consequent to the generalised lack of order in Latin 
America due to the reduction of the capacities of previously ‘strong’ states to maintain order 
through violence.23 As Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings put it, it is thought that there has 
occurred a “democratisation” of violence in the region, whereby it has:  
ceased to be the resource of only the traditionally powerful or of the 
grim uniformed guardians of the nation... [but] increasingly appears as 
an option for a multitude of actors in pursuit of all kinds of goals.24  
 
Nicaragua is a paradigmatic case in this regard. The leftist Sandinista revolution of the 1980s 
in many ways constituted something of a modernist project, which although never completely 
challenging the historically oligarchic configuration of Nicaraguan society, 25 nevertheless 
affected it sufficiently to produce what Timothy Mitchell calls a “state effect”, or in other 
words a sense of the existence of an autonomous social structure “that somehow stands apart 
from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives”. 26 The 
state expanded in an unprecedented manner, providing universal services to the population 
and establishing itself as the primary vector for the revolutionary project of transforming the 
social, economic, and political bases of life in Nicaragua. Partly as a result of civil war, but 
arguably even more due to neo- liberal prescriptions to ‘roll back’ the state, high levels of 
corruption and political disillusion, 27 declining levels of international aid, as well as a 
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profound economic crisis, the Nicaraguan state has been steadily eroded since the electoral 
defeat of the Sandinista regime in 1990 and the beginning of the process of so-called 
‘normalization’, to the extent that Katherine Isbester talks instead of a process of “state 
disintegration”. 28 
 
The most dramatic reflection of this state disintegration is widely considered to lie in the 
dramatic explosion in criminal violence that has affected the country during the past decade 
and a half. According to Nicaraguan police statistics, crime levels have increased steadily by 
an annual average of ten percent since 1990, compared to just two percent during the 1980s.29 
The absolute number of crimes more than tripled between 1990 and 2003, with crimes against 
persons – including homicides, rapes and assaults – rising by a staggering 460 percent.30 A 
1997 CID-Gallup survey reported that one in six Nicaraguans claimed to have been the victim 
of a criminal attack at least once in the previous four months, a proportion that rose to one in 
four in Managua,31 where 40 percent of all crime occurs.32 Not surprisingly, perhaps, a 1999 
survey conducted by the Nicaraguan NGO Ética y Transparencia found that crime was 
considered by the general population to be the principal problem affecting Nicaragua by a 
margin of over 30 percent.33 
 
The same survey found that 43 percent of the respondents who admitted to having been 
victims of crime stated that they had not reported the crime to the police because “it was no 
use”.34 The police have only limited patrolling capacities in urban areas, and are completely 
absent in 21 percent of the country’s 146 municipalities.35 Regionally, the Nicaraguan police 
have the lowest number of personnel per capita and per crime, the lowest budget per crime, 
the lowest budget per police personnel, and the lowest average salaries in Central America.36 
This penury obviously makes the police susceptible to corruption – thereby undermining their 
mission to establish and maintain order – and also clearly limits their technical and material 
capabilities.37 In a media interview in 2001, Commissioner Franco Montealegre admitted that 
police were often out-gunned by criminals, including in particular the widespread pandillas, 
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or youth gangs that roam the streets of Nicaraguan cities, robbing, beating, terrorising, and 
frequently killing.38  
 
The social consequences of the unchecked crime and insecurity in Nicaragua have been 
terrible, particularly at the local level, where the erosion of the social fabric has reached such 
dramatic proportions that it is no exaggeration to talk of a veritable social atomisation. “It’s 
each to his own” was an expression that was constantly repeated by my informants when 
describing Nicaraguan social life, and indeed, traditional units of social solidarity such as the 
family, household, or neighbourhood had shattered, while networks of trust and mutual aid 
had worn away. Certainly, there was little in the way of a local social collectivity, as was 
graphically described by Don Sergio, one of my informants in the poor Managua barrio 
(neighbourhood) Luis Fanor Hernández:39 
Nobody does anything for anybody anymore, nobody cares if their 
neighbour is robbed, nobody does anything for the common good. 
There’s a lack of trust, you don’t know whether somebody will return 
you your favours, or whether he won’t steal your belongings when 
your back is turned. It’s the law of the jungle here; we’re eating one 
another, as they say in the Bible… 
 
“We are living in a state of siege”, was how another of my informants called Adilia described 
the situation, adding that “people are always scared to leave their homes, it’s too dangerous”. 
Her mother, Doña Yolanda, dramatically echoed this:  
There’s so much delinquency, it’s impossible to live… they’ll kill you 
for a watch… they’ll kill you for a pair of shoes… they’ll kill you for 
your shirt … they’re everywhere, you’ve got to watch out… they 
could be your neighbour, even your friend, you can never be sure… 
you can’t go out any more, you can’t wear rings, bracelets, nice shoes, 
anything that makes us look a little better than we really are… how 
can we live? It’s not possible… 
 
There is no doubt that at one level, the situation of crisis, violence, and breakdown 
characterising contemporary Nicaragua is highly chaotic and disorderly in nature, thus 
corresponding rather closely to the received wisdom on the socio-political consequences of 
‘weakened’ states. But while the Nicaraguan state is certainly a ‘weak’ state when measured 
against its effective fulfilment of the Weberian index of having a monopoly over legitimate 
violence, this does not necessarily mean that there is a dearth of order in Nicaragua. As 
Robert Latham points out, although the condition of sovereignty – which can be defined as a 
condition whereby a specific institutional arrangement possesses final and absolute political 
authority within a given community – has traditionally been considered a property of states, it 
“can be and historically has been understood as an attribute not just of states but of other 
forms of social organization as well, operating within and across national boundaries”. In 
particular, Latham contends that it is possible to imagine the existence of non-State “bodies of 
relations that effectively structure practices and agency in a given area of life” in a manner 
equivalent to states, which he labels forms of “social sovereignty”. 40 
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Such an analysis is highly appealing in relation to Nicaragua, where the ubiquitous youth 
gangs that dominate the contemporary Nicaraguan political economy of violence can 
plausibly be conceptualised as local forms of social structuration. 41 Certainly, during the mid-
1990s, they were clearly recognisable, socially-constitutive institutional arrangements that 
obeyed definite, codified rules and adopted very specific patterns of behaviour. Gangs 
exercised their constructive function at multiple levels – the individual gang member, the 
gang group, but also the wider neighbourhood community – using violence as the cement for 
these manifold processes of social and symbolic structuring. Gang members would engage in 
violence in prescribed ways, including in particular semi-ritualised forms of gang warfare, 
which arguably constituted ‘scripted’ social performances that limited the scope of violence 
through their repetitive and regularised nature, and therefore contributed to circumscribing 
what Hannah Arendt terms the “all-pervading unpredictability” of violence.42 Similarly, the 
existence of a pervasive gang ethos of ‘loving’ and protecting – rather than preying on – their 
local neighbourhood population meant that gangs were imbued with a vigilante impulse, and 
effectively provided localised ‘safe havens’ in a wider context of chronic insecurity. Partly as 
a result, there existed a sense of identification with local gangs within neighbourhoods, 
making them primary symbolic indexes of community, effectively providing the only anchor 
point for a sense of local collective imaginary in an otherwise fractured context. 
 
The localised forms of order that Nicaraguan youth gangs constructed within a wider context 
of violence, insecurity, and social breakdown, characterised by the presence of a ‘weak’ state, 
was obviously sociologically reduced and exclusive in nature, taking the local neighbourhood 
as their ontological point of reference for the construction of this social order; rather than a 
broader territorial form such as the nation, for example, which in the post-Westphalian world 
is generally considered to be the primary reference point of states. Nevertheless, this question 
of scale notwithstanding, there is definitely a sense in which gangs and their violent practices 
can be conceived as institutionally organising local collective life in contemporary Nicaragua 
and providing local neighbourhood populations with a concrete sense of belonging to a 
definite – albeit bounded – collective entity in a way that no longer exists at the national level 
due to the chronic insecurity and declining capacities of the Nicaraguan state. 
 
Seen in this way, it is clearly possible to argue that Nicaraguan youth gangsterism in the mid-
1990s was underpinned by an analogous governmentality to the one generally attributed to the 
state. This is particularly striking in relation to the gangs’ use of violence, which like the 
state’s exercise of violence is arguably not only teleologically related to the constitution of 
social order, but moreover seems to follow remarkably similar modes of organisation. Like 
the Weberian state at the national level, gangs possess a monopoly over the predominant 
forms of violence at the local neighbourhood level, and these are moreover considered to be 
legitimate forms of violence, at least in terms of the local manifestation of the gang, because 
of their simultaneously protective and informative functions. As such, it can be argued that 
apart from the scale of the process, there is little to distinguish the governmentality of gangs 
from that of state-based forms of social ordering, and it makes sense to talk about “gang 
governmentality” on an epistemological par with “state governmentality”. The question that 
can of course legitimately be asked from this point of view, then, is whether the widely 
                                                 
41 D. Rodgers, Living in the Shadow of Death: Violence, Pandillas, and Social Disintegration in Contemporary 
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Programme working paper no. 35, London: London School of Economics, 2003. 
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perceived shift in the political economy of violence in Nicaragua is not simply a case of “old 
wine in new bottles”, with the social order previously provided by the state now being 
provided by gangs.  
 
Certainly, this is an analysis that is implicitly supported by Guillermo O’Donnell’s essay ‘On 
the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems’ about both, where he explores 
the question of the potential cohabitation between state and social forms of sovereignty. 
Although O’Donnell conceives of the state in a classically Weberian manner, as “a set of 
social relations that establishes a certain order, and ultimately backs it with a centralized 
coercive guarantee, over a given territory”, in a quasi-Spinozan fashion he contends that it is 
not the state per se that underpins the social order, but rather the effectiveness of the law that 
is lain down by the state.43 At the same time, however, O’Donnell notes that often “the 
effectiveness of the law extends very irregularly …across the territory and the functional 
relations …it supposedly regulates”, and consequently alternative, social forms of social 
structuration equivalent to the law will inevitably emerge to lay down informal rules by which 
society can organise collectively. 44 The question this obviously raises is the nature of the 
relationship that these instances of social sovereignty will have with manifestations of state 
sovereignty. 
 
O’Donnell explores these issues through the metaphor of a “heat map”, where the degree of 
state presence is signalled in different colours – with blue signalling a high degree of effective 
presence, green a partial degree of effective presence, and brown a low level of effective 
presence – which he then applies to a variety of Latin American countries. Argentina, for 
example, he contends would be mainly blue – particularly around its urban areas – with some 
patches of green in the Pampas and Patagonia and a few brown areas in the centre and the 
Northwest of the country. But while the effectiveness of the law laid down by the Argentinean 
state is very low in the centre and the Northwest of the country, O’Donnell argues that this 
does not necessarily translate into these areas being areas of anarchy, as they are dominated 
by forms of caudillismo, which he maintains are ontologically equivalent to the law in terms 
of social structuration (although it should be noted that he also argues that this is not the case 
from a normative point of view). As a result, O’Donnell argues that social order does not have 
to be “an equal, socially impartial order”, and that a partially effective, territorially-based 
central state can coexist with more localised, also territorially-based, forms of social 
structuration. 45 
 
Although this idea makes a certain amount of intuitive sense, as Abner Cohen has pointed out, 
neither change nor continuity in a given political form necessarily entails a continuity of its 
function. 46 The same form can fulfil new functions, and conversely new forms can achieve the 
same functions as preceding ones. Seen in this way, it will not automatically follow that 
different forms of social structuration that seem to be fulfilling equivalent functions will share 
the same governmentality. Indeed, although Nicaraguan gangs can superficially be portrayed 
as emergent social morphologies that develop to functionally replace the deficient Nicaraguan 
state as the primary locus of social structuration, the nature of their governmentality is very 
                                                 
43  Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization, Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999, p.135. The law for O’Donnell constitutes the “supporting texture 
of the order established and guaranteed by the …state” (O’Donnell 1999, p.135). 
44  O’Donnell (1999), pp.137-138. In making this assumption, O’Donnell implicitly further reaffirms Spinoza, 
for whom “men …cannot live without some general law” (Spinoza 1951 [1883], p.288). 
45 O’Donnell (1999), p.135. 
46 Abner Cohen, ‘Political anthropology: The analysis of the symbolism of power relations’, Man (N.S.), 4:2 
(1969), p.219. 
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different to that of the state when subjected to close scrutiny. This is particularly the case 
when the dynamics of Nicaraguan gangsterism are viewed from a longitudinal perspective, 
which reveals the way in which gang governmentality changed fundamentally between the 
mid-1990s and the early 2000s, to the extent that by 2002 youth gangsterism as a form of 
social structuration arguably constituted less an example of ‘old wine in new bottles’ than a 
case of ‘new wine in new bottles’.47 
 
Putting aside the details of this transformation, it logically follows that the state as a form of 
social structuration will also not necessarily fulfil the same functions via the same means 
constantly over time. Such a perspective makes it plausible to imagine that what is generally 
referred to as a ‘weakening’ of states might not actually constitute anything of the sort but 
rather corresponds instead to some sort of institutional transformation whereby states have 
taken on new functions and have new modes and logics of operation. In other words, it is not 
so much that they have ‘weakened’, but rather that they have ‘mutated’, to the extent that they 
may well constitute a case of ‘new wine in old bottles’. To explore this issue further, I now 
turn my attention more specifically to the basis of state governmentality, drawing in particular 
on the works of Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, and Giorgio Agamben in 
order to extract a possible alternative conception. My intention is not to provide a 
comprehensive overview of their different analyses but rather to develop a syncretic 
framework through which to better understand the changed nature of state governmentality in 
contemporary Latin America. 
 
(Re)conceptualising state governmentality 
The classic Weberian conception of the state conceptualises its governmentality as being 
intimately based on violence, insofar as the monopoly over forms of legitimate violence – to 
which can be added the extra qualifications of “compulsory jurisdiction” and “continuous 
operation” – provides the source of the power through which the state can dominate and 
control the practices and agencies of a given community, both directly and indirectly. 48 To a 
large extent, this is highly commonsensical; as Hannah Arendt lays out in her seminal On 
Violence, power can definitely very frequently be a function of violence in a number of 
different ways.49 As Walter Benjamin points out, however, violence is not a unitary 
phenomenon. He suggests that there exists a fundamental distinction between what he terms 
“law-making” violence – violence that establishes the social order – and “law-preserving 
violence” – violence that maintains order.50 This perspective implicitly reverses Arendt’s 
classic formulation of the causal relationship between violence and power, as it can be argued 
that the ability to determine – rather than simply preserving – the basis of the social order 
through violence presupposes an initial position of power that is sociologically autonomous of 
violence, considering that violence constitutes a transgression of already existing social 
structures.51 Seen in this way, instead of being a function of violence, it is power that becomes 
the determinant of its nature, scope, and ultimately logic. 
 
                                                 
47 Cf. Rodgers (2003). 
48 Weber (1948), p.81. 
49 Arendt (1969). 
50 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in W. Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical 
Writings, translated by E. Jephcott and edited by P. Demetz, New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1986 [1978]. Cf. 
also ‘The Destructive Character’, in Benjamin (1986 [1978]). 
51 D. Riches, ‘The phenomenon of violence’, in D. Riches, (ed), The Anthropology of Violence, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986. 
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Certainly, this is a view supported by Carl Schmitt, who argued that sovereignty was “not 
about the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but …the monopoly to decide”. For him, power 
derived from the ability to decide upon what he called the “state of exception”, which he 
conceived as a suspension not just of rules but also the framework in which rules apply.52 
According to Schmitt, “every general rule demands a regular, everyday frame of life to which 
it can be applied and which is submitted to its regulations”. This context of regularity is 
fundamental to a rule’s validity, and the “state of exception” consequently involves not only 
an abrogation of rules, but also of their normative context.53 It is a form of tabula rasa in 
which “a regular situation must be created” in order for rules to make sense, and therefore 
constitutes something of a liminal space within which the most basic, raw form of power is 
enacted. The most fundamental and primordial manifestation of power is the decision of who 
is a “friend”, and who is an “enemy”, according to Schmitt, who links this core expression of 
power within the “state of exception” – as well as the ability to precipitate the “state of 
exception” – to what he calls the “leadership principle”, or Führung,54 for reasons that are 
arguably epistemologically Nietzschean in nature.55 
 
Whether or not one accepts this underlying epistemology, though, the idea that the power to 
define who and what matters – and who and what do not – clearly constitutes a very concrete 
basis for social structuration, as Michel Foucault highlights in his classic consideration of 
sovereignty through the ages. According to Foucault, while “sovereign power” was classically 
based on the right “to take life or let live”, over the past three hundred years this has been 
superseded by “the right to make live and to let die”, which is the basis for what he calls 
“biopower”.  56 This shift has occurred partly because the aim of establishing a social order has 
evolved from being about the extraction of resources from a given population to being about 
the extraction of labour. Following a first stage whereby “disciplinary” forms of 
governmentality evolved to order individual bodies in time and space,57 these are replaced by 
a new form of governmentality, which Foucault calls “biopolitics”, that rest upon the 
management of whole populations rather than individuals through the identification of 
categories of “valid” and “invalid” persons, with the former being managed and “made to 
live” in particular ways, while the latter is neglected and “left to die”. Contrarily to Schmitt’s 
conception, governmentality according to Foucault therefore comes to be about normatively 
“directing conduct” rather than “confronting adversaries”.58 
 
                                                 
52 Carl Schmitt, Political theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 
[1933], p.5. 
53 Schmitt (1985 [1933]), p.19. 
54 Schmitt (1985 [1933]), p.20.  Schmitt was writing in the context of 1930s Germany and the rise of Nazism, for 
which he professed a strong admiration and later actively participated in. His reputation has been rather tainted 
as a result, and his writings have to a certain extent fallen into disrepute. 
55  Nietzsche contended that the “doing is everything” (The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals, 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956 [1872 & 1887], p.179), and that consequently “willing is creating”, with the 
“will to action” constituting a “will to power” that fixes “the value of all things ...anew” (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One, translated and with a new introduction by R. J. Hollingdale, 
London: Penguin, 1969 [1883-1885], pp.223, 136 & 139). 
56 Michel Foucault, Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, edited by Mauro 
Bertani and Allessandro Fontana and translated by David Macey, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2003 [1997], 
p.241. 
57 Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1977. 
58 Cited in Alessandro Fontana & Mauro Bertani, ‘Situating the Lectures’, in Michel Foucault, Society must be 
Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, edited by Mauro Bertani and Allessandro Fontana and 
translated by David Macey, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2003 [1997], p.284. 
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Explicitly building on both Schmitt and Foucault, Giorgio Agamben proposes a synthetic 
framework for understanding the basis of power of modern states in terms of the biopolitical 
categorisation of persons through the endless resort to the “state of exception”. Following a 
Foucauldian framework, he proposes the existence of a key biopolitical distinction between 
what he terms “political life” (bios) – that which is considered “valid” life, imbued with sense 
– and “bare life” (zoe) – that which is “invalid”, nothing more than mere existence.59 The very 
act of creating circumstances within which persons can be classified as one or the other is “the 
originary activity of the sovereign”, according to Agamben, as the possibility of exclusion 
from “political life” inherently constitutes the progenitorial basis of social structuration. 60 By 
producing categories of persons that are included in the political community but denied 
membership of it, these persons are powerfully constituted as groups on whom forms of 
regulation can be exercised. Drawing on Schmitt, Agamben argues that the governmentality 
of modern states therefore revolves fundamentally around the “continually operative” 
precipitation of a “state of exception”, within which the boundaries between these two 
primordial categories are constantly drawn and redrawn. In other words, the establishment of 
a “state of exception” constitutes a strategic principle of power that becomes the basis of the 
governmentality of modern states.61 
 
The paradigmatic example of this according to Agamben is the Nazi concentration camp, 
where Jews were first stripped of their citizenship and then constituted as non-human 
“others”, 62 but  it is possible to imagine a less exceptional – so to speak – enactment of such a 
form of state governmentality in the shape of a routinised pathologisation of persons that is 
embedded in everyday practices. Such a framework of state governmentality would arguably 
provide the basis for explaining how despite the fact that gangs clearly possess significant 
political authority at the local neighbourhood level in Nicaragua, the state nevertheless 
continues to exist as a recognisable and influential institution. Contrarily to Nina Glick 
Schiller and Georges Fouron’s notion that such putatively “weak” states can be qualified as 
“apparent states”, that is to say states with all the “fixings” of a state – such as a political 
system, legislature, regulars elections, police, army, and government ministries – but with 
little power to meet the needs of their population, 63 it can be argued that the Nicaraguan state 
constitutes at best an “apparent weak state”, or in other words a state that appears to be 
“weak” when considered from a classic Weberian perspective, but that in fact is imbued with 
a different kind of governmentality based on the permanent of division of the population into 
groups of “valid” and “invalid” citizens. This form of governmentality does not necessarily 
require a constant control or domination over a given population in an Orwellian “Big 
Brother” fashion, 64 but rather can be enacted through the ability to sporadically precipitate a 
“state of exception”, in which the state symbolically demonstrates its power through arbitrary 
                                                 
59 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life , Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
60  Agamben (1998), p.83. Agamben contends that politics and the “state of exception” cannot be ontologically 
segregated, and ultimately the latter is neither liminal nor apolitical, but rather a fundamental space in which 
wider relations of power and domination are explicitly fought out. The ability to precipitate a “state of 
exception” therefore constitutes a significant form of power that can actually constitute the basis of a form of 
state governmentality. 
61 Agamben (1998), p.109. 
62 Cf. also Stephan Feuchtwang, ‘Images of sub-humanity and their realization’, draft paper prepared for the 
workshop on “Understanding State Violence”, Department of Anthropology, Goldsmiths’ College and Crisis 
States Programme, London School of Economics, 4-5 June 2004, mimeo. 
63 Nina Glick Schiller & Georges Fouron, ‘Killing Me Softly: Violence, Globalization, and the Apparent State’, 
in J. Friedman (ed), Globalization, the State, and Violence, Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2003. 
64  In his novel, 1984, George Orwell describes this form of control in the following graphic terms: “Imagine a 
boot stamping on a human face – for ever” (Nineteen Eighty-Four, London: Penguin, 1984 [1949], p.206). 
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acts of violence that emphasize that it is unaccountable, unpredictable, and therefore creates a 
sense of terror among those targeted.  
 
In other words, this new form of governmentality does not require that the state be a constant  
or even a constantly effective presence. This conception of state sovereignty is 
epistemologically different to O’Donnell, who assumes that the effectiveness of the law or 
law-equivalent is a function of the constancy of the state or non-state form of social 
structuration. 65 In terms of the notion of governmentality, this arguably leads to an 
assumption that social structuration is a singular, universal process, and whether it is state-
based or social in nature, that it will always occur unchangingly in the same way, on the same 
sociological basis, particularly when considered in terms of the exercise of violence. The 
problem with this is that it promotes a very narrow concept of both state- and socially-based 
forms of social structuration, normatively investing them with respectively a general and a 
particularistic focus. However, just as social forms of social structuration such as Nicaraguan 
gangs in the 1990s can be seen as particularistic in nature but acting in a general way, so the 
state, which is generally considered to be principally focused on managing a nation’s general 
good, can also become a locus for very parochial interests. Such a form of governmentality at 
one level represents something of a “rupture”, 66 and threatens to “join order and disorder into 
indistinction”, 67 but it also allows us to attain a conception of social reality that is consistent 
with Benjamin’s seminal insight that “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state 
of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule”. 68 As Michael Taussig has 
shown, this description is more in correspondence with the lived experience of life in 
contemporary Latin America – including, as is collectively suggested by Don Sergio, Adilia, 
and Doña Yolanda’s above, Nicaragua – which ultimately can be qualified as situations of 
“ordered disorder”, which are simultaneously “the exception and the rule”. 69 
 
 
The governmentality of state violence in contemporary Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan state’s ever- increasing inability to control and dominate the geographical 
territory it is historically associated with is frequently held up as an example of its 
consummate ‘weakness’, particularly in relation to its ability to exercise violence and impose 
order.70 The high rates of crime and delinquency, combined with the general inefficiency of 
the policy and a rollback of the modernist gains of the Sandinista revolution, are widely seen 
to exemplify this reduction in the state’s capacities. A different conception of the evolution of 
the Nicaraguan state can be suggested, however, whereby the nature of its governmentality 
has changed such that it no longer seeks to violently control and dominate the whole of its 
territory according to the classic Weberian model, but rather instrumentally exercises its 
violence in an inconstant manner that serves only a limited range of specific purposes.  
 
To a certain extent it could be argued that this new form of governmentality is causally linked 
to the reduction of the Nicaraguan state’s capacities due to neo- liberalism and globalisation, 
                                                 
65  O’Donnell (1999). Indeed, in many ways, O’Donnell’s model of the nature of Latin American societies can be 
said to essentially see them in terms of national-level equilibriums between state and non-state forms of social 
structuration. 
66 Agamben (1998), p.40. 
67 Agamben (1998), p.32. 
68 W. Benjamin, ‘Theses on the philosophy of history’, in W. Benjamin, Illuminations, translated by H. Zohn and 
edited by H. Arendt, London: Fontana Press, 1992 [1968], p.248. 
69 Taussig (1992), p.2; cf. also M. Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and 
Healing, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
70 Isbester (1996). 
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and that it in essence represents a ‘politics of the possible’ insofar as the state lacks the 
resources to control and dominate territories in the way it used to in the past; and all the more 
so in a context where a variety of social actors can now effectively manipulate violence. 
While this may be partially the case, it can also be maintained that the increased violence that 
has partly resulted from the withdrawal of the state from the public arena has also constituted 
a context within which new forms of violent action have become possible, including in 
particular the increasingly accepted exercise of what was previously considered unreasonable 
violence against specific categories of persons occupying a given territory. Just as Caldeira 
notes how in urban Brazil, for example, the poor have become stigmatised as inherently 
dangerous “animals”, 71 therefore undeserving of human rights and against which extreme 
brutality is acceptable. In Nicaragua, although this has not (yet) reached equivalent levels to 
Brazil, there has occurred a rise in violent, arbitrary and sporadic ‘raids’ on poor 
neighbourhoods by the police over the past few years, as well as a tendency towards the 
criminalisation of certain groups such as youth (especially if they have tattoos or other 
trappings of gang membership). 
 
In many ways, however, it is at the territorial level that this new form of governmentality is 
most apparent in contemporary Nicaragua.72 This is particularly evident in relation to the 
spatial reorganisation of Managua, the capital city of Nicaragua, during the past decade, 
which has undergone a process whereby a whole layer of the metropolis has been 
‘disembedded’ from the general fabric of the city through the constitution of an exclusive 
‘fortified network’ for the urban elites, based on the privatisation of security and the 
construction of high speed roads and roundabouts from which the poor are aggressively 
excluded. This pattern of urban development rests upon the emergence of a new urban 
governmentality that explicitly favours the urban elites, both directly and indirectly. In a 
wider context of a growing transnationalism that sees them looking increasingly towards 
Miami and other points outside Nicaraguan for the basis of their lives, these have little interest 
in controlling the whole of a country that is generally poor and offers them little in the way of 
economic opportunities – and even less the whole of a sprawling city, most of which they 
never visit. Their interest lies principally in ensuring the security and exclusivity of the 
limited spaces they occupy, including their homes, offices, shopping malls, clubs, bars, and 
restaurants.73  
 
Beyond the question of governmentality, the constitution of such “power-geometries” raises 
critical questions about the nature of social relations between different groups within a given 
territorial space.74 This breathes new life to the other classic conception of the state, that 
proposed by Karl Marx, whereby it is conceived as an institution that serves the interests of a 
dominant class.75 In many ways this provides a much more concrete (material) basis to the 
origins of the power that permits the enactment of the alternative framework of state 
governmentality outlined above than the Nietzschean epistemology that ultimately underpins 
Agamben’s conception (as well as Schmitt’s and Foucault’s). This allows a line of thought 
that sees the predicament of contemporary Nicaragua in terms of a historical sequence 
                                                 
71 Caldeira (1996). 
72 This is in many ways paradoxical, because a distinguishing feature of the alternative conception of 
governmentality outlined above compared to the Weberian conception of state governmentality is that it is not 
inherently territorial in nature. 
73 Cf. D. Rodgers, ‘Disembedding the City: Crime, Insecurity, and Spatial Organisation in Managua, Nicaragua’, 
Environment and Urbanization, 16:2 (October 2004), pp.113-124, for a detailed description. 
74 Doreen Massey, ‘Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place’, in Jon Bird (ed.), Mapping the Futures: 
Local Cultures, Global Change, London: Routledge, 1993. 
75 Karl Marx, Selected Writings, edited by D. McLellan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
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whereby following a decade of popular revolutionary rule and the attempted establishment of 
a modernist state, followed by an anomic and spontaneous “revolt of the masses” in the form 
of rampant crime and delinquency,76 the past decade has seen the Nicaraguan urban elites – 
both traditional and new – conduct their own “revolt of the elites”. 77 In a changed global 
context where their material basis is no longer national, they are arguably flexing their muscle 
in order to go their own way, adopting modes of being and promoting a social order that 
constitutes a rejection of the Sandinista modernist project, and in many ways is a return to 
past pre-revolutionary forms of inequality, alienation, and injustice that led to the revolution 




I have argued in this paper that the epistemological nature of both order and violence are 
eminently changeable, and that they are not unitary, singular phenomena. From this 
perspective, although a case can be made that the state violence upon which order has been 
based during the past two hundred years has declined in post-Cold War Latin America, and 
has been replaced by new forms of ‘social sovereignty’ that implicitly constitute ‘old wine in 
new bottles’ – insofar as they are also concerned with the constitution of the social order – it 
can also be contended that instead of being residual, the continuing presence of state-based 
forms of violence in fact constitutes an example of ‘new wine in old bottles’, with the 
governmentality of states, particularly in relation to their use of violence, having evolved and 
now being underpinned by a different dynamic to the past. I have proposed an alternative 
conception of state governmentality that illustrates how this governmentality operates, 
illustrating it schematically in the Nicaraguan context. This possibility suggests that there is a 
crucial need to rethink the nature of the state in contemporary Latin America, and that to 
understand what kind of institution the state is, and how and why it exercises violence, it is 
critical to think about the nature of the state’s rationale of governance.  
 
In his famed Political Treatise, Spinoza proposes that:  
the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general fear, and prevent 
general sufferings, and therefore pursues above everything the very 
end, after which everyone, strives, but in the natural state strives 
vainly.78  
As with many of his contemporaries or near-contemporaries, such as Locke, Voltaire, or 
Rousseau, Spinoza was imbued with a certain faith in the innate rationality of human beings 
and the states they constructed, arguing that the natural tendency towards an order that 
constituted “the best of all possible worlds” inevitably led to “civil states”. There is a paradox 
in this idea, in that at the same time Spinoza also argues that “a state is not bound by law 
insofar as the state establishes the law”. From this perspective, there is no reason other than 
faith to expect a state to be “civil”, and the fundamental question to ask is what happens when 
‘uncivil states’ emerge.79  
 
                                                 
76 J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, translated by A. Kerrigan and edited by K. Moore, Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1985 [1932]. 
77 C. Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1995. 
78 Spinoza (1951 [1883]), p.303. 
79 Spinoza (1951 [1883]), p.311. 
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In many ways, there is a sense in which this question is sidestepped by the dominant 
discourse on ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states.80 All too often, behind the label of ‘weak’ states there 
are what Stephan Feuchtwang has called “spectral states”, which operate under the veil of 
their supposed ‘weakness’,81 to the extent that it often constitutes an excuse for any atrocities 
that they might perpetuate.82 Indeed, in many ways ‘spectral violence’ is perhaps the most 
effective form of violence, precisely because it is hidden from view by a conception of social 
reality that sees it as a consequence of dysfunction. Seen in this way, we come back to our 
starting point, and the need for a more fine-grained analysis of the state that ‘denaturalises’ it 
and sees it as the historically contingent and highly variable construction that it is, 
representing the “sedimentation” of everyday routinised practices of power that need to be 
understood on their own terms rather than putative normative ones.83 Only in this way will we 
truly be able to understand the underlying basis of state governmentality, and get to grips with 
the task of judging which states are ‘good’, and which ones are ‘bad’. 
 
                                                 
80 Cf. F. Fukuyama , State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, London: Profile 
Books, 2004. 
81 Feuchtwang (2004). 
82 James Fairhead, ‘Three million die in the Congo: You, me and the horror’, professorial lecture delivered to the 
Sussex Development lecture series, University of Sussex, 11 February 2003; C. Nordstrom, ‘Shadows and 
Sovereigns’, Theory, Culture & Society , 17:4 (2000), pp.35-54; and C. Nordstrom, Shadows of War: Violence, 
Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004. 
83 Cf. Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time , London: Verso, 1990, pp.34-35. 
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